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Book Review

The Fifth Auxiliary Right
To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right. By Joyce

Lee Malcolm." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1994. Pp. xii, 232.

$35.00.

Robert

J.

Cottrolt and Raymond T. Diamondtt

[I]n vain would these rights [personal security, personal liberty, and
private property] be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead
letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no other method to
secure their actual enjoyment. It has therefore established certain other
auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as
barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary
rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject . .. is that of
having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree,
and such as are allowed by law.Which is also declared by the same
statute ... and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions,
of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the
violence of oppression.1
*

t
tt
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Joyce Lee Malcolm's timely study, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins
of an Anglo-American Right,2 brings the insights of a student of early modern
English political history to the contemporary debate over the Second
Amendment.3 Through an examination of statutes and cases, of English
constitutional thought, and of the political, social, and cultural background of
English history and law from the seventeenth century to the twentieth,
Malcolm does more than simply outline the history of the English right to
arms. As her subtitle promises, Malcolm brings into sharp relief the origins of
the right to arms not only in English ideological and constitutional thought, but
in American constitutionalism as well.
Malcolm's study traces the transformation of the traditional duty of the
English population to have arms for the common defense into the notion of a
political right t o arms to resist potential excesses of the Crown. She first
focuses on the political turmoil that was seventeenth-century England, a unique
century in modern English history. A Scottish family occupied the English
t hrone.4 A King, Charles I, was beheaded . A most un-English experiment,
eleven years of republican rule, the Protectorate, was attempted. And by the
end of the century, the English exacted a Declaration of Rights from their new
rulers, William and M ary. That declaration included the right to arms. Then,
Professor Malcolm takes her study beyond the seventeenth-century background
that helped produce a formal recognition of the right to arms. She examines
the subsequent history of the right to arms i n England and how it became a
virtual nullity in the t wentieth century.
This Review examines Malcolm's study. Part I explores the modern
American debate over the Second Amendment-the quality of which will be
greatly improved by Malcolm's contribution of To Keep and Bear Arms.
Part II examines Malcolm's treatment of seventeenth-century English
constitutionalism and how the right to ar ms became part of English
constitutional t hinking. Part III traces the social and cultural developments that
led to the ultimate evisceration of the right to arms in the United Kingdom in
t he twentieth century. Part IV concludes by discussing the significance of
Professor Malcolm's history of the English right to arms for late-twentieth
century Americans concerned both with guns and violence and with arms and
rights.

2. JOYCE L. MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT
(1994) [hereinafter To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS].
3. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.

�

4. Historian R ger Lockyer suggests that the friction between the English and their Stuart Kings that
_
started at the begmnmg of the seventeenth century may have been rooted in the more authoritarian tradition

of Scottish law, which, unlike the common law of England, was rooted in Roman law. See generally

ROGER LOCKYER, TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN, 1471-1714 (1964).

1995]

The Fifth Auxiliary Right

997

I. AN AMERICA N DEBATE, AN ENGLISH PREFACE
The d�ba�e over the Secon� Amend�ent is one of the more i ntriguing
_
_
cont�overs1es m A merican
constitutional
discourse. Few issues excite greater
passion. For better than a generation, the debate over the right to keep and bear
�ms has ?een a staple of editorial and op-ed writers in the popular press.s It
is the subject of a vast polemical literature by partisans on both sides of the
often acrimo�ious gun control debate. Respected legal scholars, in the pages
.
of this law Journal, have in recent years termed the Second Amendment
"embarrassing"6 and "terrifying."7 Warren Burger has indicated his belief that
the Amendment's inclusion in the Bill of Rights was a mistake, a startling
assertion about a provision of the Bill of Rights by a former Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. 8
Some see the Amendment as a guarantee of political freedom, a hedge
against a potentially tyrannical government.9 Despite prevailing stereotypes,
5. For some examples from the last decade, see, e.g., Daniel Abrams, What "Right To Bear Arms"?,

N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1989, at A23; Warren E. Burger, The Right To Bear Arms, PARADE MAG., Jan. 14, .
1990, at 4; Robert J. Cottrol, It's Time To Enforce the Second Amendment, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 17,
1990, at SB; Erwin N. Griswold , Phantom Second Amendment "Rights", WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1990, at

C7; Michael Kinsley, Slicing Up the Second Amendment, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1990, at A25; Sue
Wimmershoff-Caplan, The Founders and the AK-47, WASH. POST, July 6, 1989, at A l 7.
6. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). It should be
stressed that Levinson's use of the term "embarrassing" to describe the Second Amendment was not

an

indication that he believed the provision inappropriate or out of place in the American constitutional order.
Instead his article pointed out how the legal academy regarded the right to arms as a constitutional blind
alley, unworthy of scholarly attention. Levinson's purpose was to inform the academy that important
constitutional and political issues lie behind the Second Amendment and to encourage scholars to treat
those issues with due seriousness. His article, along with the deepening of the gun control debate in the

I 990's, the observance of the two-hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Rights in 1991, the revival of

interest in civic republicanism in the legal academy, and the reinvigorated debate over the Fourteenth
Amendment and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, have all combined to create something of a mini
boom of Second Amendment scholarship among law teachers. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1210--12 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill

of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The
Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991); Glenn H.
Reynolds, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic
Republican Thought, 6 1 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the

Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second
Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007 (1994). Literary scholar Elaine Scarry has taken the Second
Amendment issue beyond the traditional confines of the gun control debate and has asked provocative
questions concerning the Second Amendment's implications for the President's war-making powers in the
nuclear age. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right To
Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991); see also Stephanie A. Levin, Grassroots Voices: Local Action
and National Military Policy, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 321 (1992) (discussing Second Amendment implications
for national war-making powers). Nicholas Johnson has looked at possible Ninth Amendment protection
Arms
for the right to arms. Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right To
Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. I (1992).
Amendment,
7. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).

in LEXIS, News
8. MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991), available

Library, Script File.
9. See, e.g. , Nelson

Lund,

to SelfThe Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right

Preservation, 39 ALA. L. R EV. I03 (1987).
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this position cuts across familiar ideological lines. 10 It has been embraced, to
varying degrees, by the generally conservative National Rifle Association, by
liberal constitutional scholar Sanford Levinson,I1
Colonel-turned-syndicated-columnist

Harry

and

Summers. Ii

by

retired-Army

Others,

including

former Chief Justice Burger,I3 conservative former Supreme Court nominee
Robert Bork, I4 and various gun control advocacy groups, see the Second
Amendment as having been inappropriately used as a tool to combat needed
public safety and a nticrime measures. 15
Oddly enough, this often-rancorous exchange has long been neglected by
those to whom we normally turn for constitutional interpretation: the legal
academy and the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court. Members of the
legal academy, until relatively recently, have been reluctant to join the Second
Amendment debate, 16 and the nature of the right to arms remains a historical

10.

Ironically, in light of the general tendency of liberals to favor stricter gun control measures and

the tendency of conservatives to oppose such measures, in the not-too-recent past strong support for the
right to bear arms as a means of preventing state oppression often came from political figures on the left.

Both Malcolm X and the Black P anthers urged black people to acquire arms as protection against police
brutality and attacks by white racists. See Raymond G. Kessler, The Political Functions of Gun Control,

in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE 457, 479-82 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1984). Also, that exemplar of postwar

liberal thinking, Hubert Humphrey, once vigorously endorsed the link between the right to keep and bear

arms and political freedom. Writing in a magazine for gun enthusiasts, Humphrey stated:
Certainly one of the chief guarantees of freedom under any government, no matter how popular
and respected, is the right of citizens to keep and bear arms. This is not to say that firearms

should not be very carefully used and that definite safety rules of precaution should not be
taught and enforced. But the right of citizens to bear arms is just one more guarantee against
arbitrary government, and one more safeguard against a ty ranny which now appears remote in
America, but which historically has proved to be always possible.
Hubert Humphrey, Know Your Lawmakers, GUNS, Feb. 1960, at 4.
1 1 . Levinson, supra note 6.

12. Harry Summers, Gun-Collecting in Uthuania, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1990, at F4.
13. MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, supra note 8.
14.

See, e.g., Robert Bork & Laurence Tribe, The Advocates: Point and Counterpoint, LIFE, Fall 1991

(special issue), at 96.
15.

It should be noted that the vast majority of those who have commented on the Second Amendment

in the popular press have tended, not surprisingly, to view the Amendment as confirming their own views
of good public policy. Thus, supporters of. stricter gun control measures have tended to argue for the
collective rights view, that is, that the Amendment was only designed to protect the right of states to
maintain militias, while opponents of stricter measures have tended to argue that the right protected is an
individual one. See infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text. There are at least two interesting exceptions

to this general rule. Syndicated columnist Michael Kinsley, a member of the gun control advocacy group

Handgun Control Inc. and an advocate of stricter gun control, has conceded, reluctantly, that the Second
Amendment was meant to protect an individual right to arms and that at some level such an intention must

be honored. See Kinsley, supra note 5, at A25. George Will, another advocate of stricter gun control, has

conceded: "The National Rifle Association is perhaps correct and certainly is plausible in its 'strong'

reading of the Second Amendment protection of private gun ownership." George F. Will, Americas Crisis

of Gunfire, WASH. Pos-r, Mar. 21, 1991, at A2 I. This view has led him to call for the Amendment's repeal.
16.

See supra note 6. Second Amendment scholarship is one area where practicing attorneys, usually

activists in the gun control controversy, have done pioneering work, often leaving their academic colleagues
to follow in their footsteps. Three of the most prolific and influential practitioner-scholars in the field whose
writings, beginning in the

1980's, have played a major part in producing the ongoing academic

reexamination of the subject in the 1990's are Stephen P. Halbrook, David T. Hardy, and Don B. Kates, Jr.
Their writings have played a major role in reinvigorating the individual rights view of the Second
Amendment and in revealing the links between the Second Amendment and such themes as individual self
defense, classical republican ideology, and the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
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controversy more faithfully attended to by partisans on different sides of the
gun control debate than by professional historians.17 The Second Amendment
also continues to be an arena of jurisprudence from which the nation's highest
Court has largely been absent. The nation's highest tribunal has seriously
addressed the issue in only three cases, 18 and the most recent of these, United
See, e.g., STEPHE N P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL

RIG HT (1984) [hereinafter H A L BROOK, EVERY M A N ]; Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the
Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GE O. MASON U. L. REY. 1 (1981); Stephen P. Halbrook, What the
Framers Intended: A Linguistic Anal ysis of the Right To "Bear Arms", 49 LAW & CONTE MP. PROBS. 151

( 1986) [hereinafter Halbrook, What the Framers Intended]; David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 559 (1986); David

T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L . & P OL Y I (1987)
'

[hereinafter Hardy, Historiography]; Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Me aning of
the Second Amendment, 82 M I C H. L. REV. 204 (1983) (hereinafter Kates, Handgun Prohibition]; Don B.

Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986); Don B. Kates,
Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMME NTARY 87 (1992).

17. In part because the Second Amendment debate is fundamentally a debate about historical meaning,
historians entered the debate somewhat earlier than members of the legal academy. One important debate
about the implications of classical republican political ideology for the collective rights and individual rights
perspectives on the Second Amendment occurred in the J 980's in the leading journal on U.S. history, The
Journal of American History. See Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning
of the Right To Bear Arms, 7 1 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Robert E . Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the
Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982); Robert E. Shalhope & Lawrence D. Cress, The Second
Amendment and the Right To Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. AM. HIST. 587 (1984). Joyce Malcolm had

also done considerable writing on the subject, even before the publication of To Keep and Bear Arms. See,
e.g., JOYCE L. MALCOLM, DISARMED: THE Loss OF T H E

RIGHT To BE AR ARMS IN RESTORATION

ENGLAND; Joyce L. Malcolm, The Creation of a "True Antient and Indubitable" Right: The English Bill
of Rights and the Right To Be Armed, 32 J. BRIT. STUD. 226 ( 1993); Joyce L. Malcolm, The Right of the
People To Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, IO HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983)

[hereinafter Malcolm, The Right of the People]; Joyce L. Malcolm, Book Review, 54 GE O. WASH. L. REV.
452 (1986) (reviewing HALBROOK, EVERY MAN, supra note 16).

18. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The Second Amendment actually has had a somewhat curious
history in the nation's highest Court. Crui kshank and Presser really tell us more about the Court's reaction
to the Fourteenth Amendment than to the Second. Miller, the only case in which the Court has had to
decide the extent to which the Second Amendment limits the ability of the federal government to restrict
the possession of certain types of firearms, was decided even though the Court heard only the government's
case. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Second Amendment: Invitation to a Multi-Dimensional Debate, in GUN
CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION at ix, xxvi-xxix (Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1994). Since Miller, although

a .number of lower federal courts have upheld various gun control measures by reasoning either that the
Second Amendment does not restrict action by state governments or that it protects only the right of a state
to maintain militias, the Supreme Court generally has declined to hear these cases and make a definitive
modern pronouncement on the subject. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
Although the Court has done little to develop an actual jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, it
has a Jong history of presenting the Amendment in what might be termed "family portraits" of the rights
of the American people. T his has occurred in cases having nothing to do with the issue of firearms
regulation. Thus in. Dred Scott

v.

Sanford, Chief Justice Roger Taney argued that Negroes, slave or free,

could not be citizens because they were commonly subject to restrictions that would, presumably, have been
impermissible if imposed on whites:
It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one State
of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, . . . and it would give
them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own
citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms
wherever they went.
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857) (emphasis added).

In more recent times, even as the right to arms has become more politically controversial, the Second
Amendment has served as a kind of curious bit player in Supreme Court opinions dealing with the right
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States

v.
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Miller, is over fifty years old.

This controversy occurs at the most fundamental level: It is a debate over
the Amendment's basic meaning. Briefly stated, the modem debate over the
Second Amendment is about the extent to which that constitutional provision
was intended to limit the ability of government to prohibit or severely restrict
private ownership of firearms. It is a debate shaped in part by high national
crime rates-an average of 11,000 homicides occur annually in incidents
involving firearms19-and in part by the presence of firearms in roughly half
0
the households in the country. 2
This debate has produced two familiar interpretations of the Second
Amendment. Advocates of stricter gun controls have tended to stress the
Amendment's Militia Clause ("A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State"), arguing that the purpose of the Amendment was to
maintain state militias against federal encroachment. 21 Advocates of this view,
to privacy. Starting with Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, a case involving Connecticut's
anticontraception statute, Court decisions have reiterated Harlan's view that the rights of Americans are
more extensive than those enumerated in the Bill of Rights:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.
This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in tenns of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 ( 1 96 1 ) (emphasis added); see, e. g. , Planned Parenthood

v.

Casey, 1 1 2

S. Ct. 279 1 , 28 1 1 ( 1 992) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543); Moore v.City ofE. Cleveland, 43 1 U S. 494
.

,

50 1 ( 1 977) (same); Roe v. Wade, 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3, 1 69 ( 1 973) (same).
More recently, in his discussion of the scope of the term "the people," Chief Justice William
Rehnquist hinted at his views on the Second Amendment:

"[T]he people" seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution.
The Preamble declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by "the People of the
United States." The Second Amendment protects "the right of the people to keep and bear

Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are
retained by and reserved to "the people." .. . While this textual exegesis is by no means
conclusive, it suggests that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First
and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth
A mendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1 990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) .
In a very real sense, for the modern Supreme Court, the Second Amendment has become akin to a
disreputable member of the family. The modem Court acknowledges the Second Amendment on occasions

when generally discussing the constitutional rights of Americans, even though the Court remains reluctant
to grapple with cases squarely addressing the Second Amendment. William Van Alstyne makes the valuable
observation that the Court's treatment of the Second Amendment is very much like its treatment of the First
Amendment before World War I. The Amendment was acknowledged but was not the subject of any
meaningful case law or jurisprudence. Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1 239.

19. Homicides, however, do not constitute the majority of firearm-related deaths. Criminologist Gary
Kleck breaks the 3 1 ,606 total firearm deaths for the year 1 985 into the following categories: accident

(1 649); suicide (1 7,369); homicide ( 1 1 ,621 ); legal intervention, i.e., killings by police in the line of duty
(486); undetermined (481 ). GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 60-61 ( 1 99 1 ) .
20. Id. at xiii; JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 1 1 6-17 (1 983).
2 1 . See, e.g., Cress, supra note 1 7; Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment
in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 1 5 U. DAYTON L. REV 5 ( 1 989); Roy G.
Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 ( 1 975).
.
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the so-called collective rights theory, argue that the Framers' sole concern was
preventing the concentration of military power in the hands of the federal
government.
Opponents of stricter gun controls have tended to stress the Amendment's
second clause ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed") and note that the Framers intended a militia of the whole, or at
least one consisting o f the entire able-bodied white male population. They
argue that this militia of the whole was expected to perform its duties with
privately owned weapons. Advocates of this individual rights theory also argue
that the Militia Clause should be read as an amplifying rather than a qualifying
clause; that is, although maintaining a "well-regulated militia" was a major
reason for including the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights, it should not
be viewed as the sole or limiting reason. Instead, other reasons, such as a right
to individual self-defense, must be understood as within the Framers'
contemplations.22
Little in either the historical record or the language of the Amendment
supports the collective rights theory, at least at its most simplistic level-i.e.,
that the Second Amendment simply was meant to reserve states the right to
raise or maintain militia units.23 The historical evidence overwhelmingly
supports the view that the militia envisioned in the Second Amendment
consisted of virtually all adult white men24 equipped with their own arms.25
22. For two representative examples of these opposing viewpoints, see Cress, supra note 17, and
Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 16.
23. But see Michael K. Beard & Kristen M. Rand, The Handgun Battle, 20 BILL RTS. J. 13 (1987)
(arguing that Second Amendment is concerned with states' rights rather than individual rights).
24.

For

a

discussion of the sentiments of the Framers' generation concerning the armed populace,

select and universal militias, and the maintenance of political freedom,

see

HALBROOK, EVERY MAN, supra

note 16, at 55-87; see also Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 6, at 327-30. The first militia act, the Uniform
Militia Act of 1792, called for the enrollment of every free, able-bodied white male citizen between the
ages of 18 and 45. Militia members were required to

§ I, I

arm

themselves. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33,

Stat. 271. We have argued that, even though the Act specified the enrollment of white men, women

and free black men were also part of the militia. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 6, at 316 n.22,
331-32.
It is of dual significance that, overwhelmingly, commentators in the antebellum y ears of the 19th
century wrote of the Second Amendment

as

a right of individuals. To our knowledge, no commentator in

the antebellum era offered an interpretation of the Second Amendment that indicated that the right was only
a right of the states or was limited to those actively involved in militia service. See, e.g., Nunn v. Georgia,

I Ga. 243, 250 (1846); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
708-:-09

(Carolina

Academic Press 1987) (1833).

The importance of such antebellum interpretations does not end with the light they may shed on the
original meaning of the Second Amendment. Such interpretations also have much to tell us about how the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the Second Amendment and the extent to which they
intended to protect the right to bear arms against state infringement. The best evidence indicates that the
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 39th Congress saw the individual right to arms as a
fundamental one requiring federal protection against state infringement. See MI CHAEL K. C URTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FO URTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Amar, The Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1237; Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 6, at
342-49; Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, supra note 16, at 9-11.
25. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33,

§ I, I

Stat. 271. The Miller Court recognized this point:

The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the
history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators.
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A universally or even widely armed population was seen as supporting a well
regulated militia in at least two ways. First, it ensured arms for the individual
militiaman: He brought his own. Second, it guaranteed widespread familiarity
with arms amongst the population, enhancing the military effectiveness of the
militia of the whole.
The text of the Second Amendment also poses unmet challenges for those
who would claim that it was not meant to protect an individual right.26
Several points should be noted. To begin with, the first clause, discussing the
well-regulated militia, seems to be the dependent clause. According to this
reading, a well-regulated militia depends on the right of the people to keep and
bear arms. The language does not support the opposite reading, that the right
of the people to keep and bear arms depends on the maintenance or
preservation of a well-regulated militia. It should also be noted that the
Amendment has two parts: ( 1) an observation, or p erhaps a cautionary note
("A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State") and
(2) a command or legal requirement ("the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed"). The plain language of the first clause appears
to impose no legal requirement or restriction on the federal government. Only
the second clause indicates a right that the government cannot infringe.
In addition, the second clause speaks of the "right of the people." We
agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion in United States v. Verdugo
Urquidez21 that "the people" referred to in the Second Amendment are the
same as "the people" discussed in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments. It is hardly credible to assume that the Framers' reference to
"the people" indicated intent to protect the rights of private individuals to
assemble peaceably and to petition the government in the First Amendment,
but was somehow transformed in the Second Amendment to refer to a right of
states to keep and bear arms, and then miraculously reverted to indicate an
individual right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects in the
Fourth Amendment and an individual's residual rights and powers in the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. It should also be noted that the term "the people" is
a broader term than "the militia." Although the First Congress envisioned a
militia that would encompass virtually the entire adult male population below
the age of forty-five,28 the term "the people" certainly was meant to include

These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable
of acting in
concert for the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for military
discipline." And
furth�r, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to
appear bearing arms
supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
26. For two studies that have contributed to the textual interpretati
on of the Second Amendment, see
Halbrook, What the Framers Intended, supra note 16; Van Alstyne,
supra note 6.
27. 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1989); see supra note 18.
28.

Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33,

§

I, I Stat. 271.
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adult white men over that age, adult white women, and, arguably, free
Negroes.
Closer examination of the second clause further supports the individual
rights interpretation. The phrase "to bear arms" is ambiguous. It could be
interpreted either as bearing arms for militia purposes or as bearing arms for
private purposes. An individual right to keep arms, however, can only be
looked upon as a private right, a right to have arms in one's home. Even the
most restrictive view of that right-that the right protected is only a right to
keep arms in one's home to ensure availability for militia duty-presents the
right as the individual's right and not the state's.
Finally, the language of the Second Amendment suggests an intent to
preserve a recognized, preexisting right rather than to create a new one. If, for
example, the Amendment was intended to create a right to address the needs
of states to maintain militias, the text might have read: "A well-regulated
Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the people shall have the
right to keep and bear Arms." The use of the phrase "the right of the people"
instead of the phrase "the people shall have the right" suggests a preexisting
right that at the very least encompasses the right to arms for militia purposes
but that presumably is even broader.29
Although the most simplistic variant of the collective rights theory runs
into such stubborn historical and textual resistance that, at its most extreme,
it can be readily dismissed as a type of result-oriented constitutional denial,
there is a more sophisticated version of the collective rights view that raises
more difficult questions

and deserves closer scrutiny. The

sophisticated

collective rights view acknowledges that the Second Amendment was designed
to protect individual ownership of arms, but then argues that this individual
guarantee was inextricably linked to the maintenance of the militia. 30 In short,
unlike the individual rights theorists,

the

sophisticated collective rights

adherents see the individual right as existing but also see the Amendment's
well-regulated militia clause as qualifying rather than amplifying. For these
theorists the answer becomes simple: Because the militia of the whole has·
essentially disappeared, then the individual right has ceased to exist. The
Second Amendment poses no impediment to gun control measures, however
restrictive.

29. Roger Sherman's 1789 proposal for the Bill of Rights offers an actual point of co mparison. That
proposal included a provision designed to safeguard state militia prerogatives. Note how its language differs
from that of the Second Amendment:
The militia shall be under the government of the laws of the respective States, when not in the
actual Service of the united States, but such rules

as

may be prescribed by Congress for their

uniform organization & discipline shall be observed in officering and training them, but military

Service shall not be required of persons religiously scrupulous of bearing arms.
ROGER SHERMAN, PROPOSAL FOR A SEPARAW BILL OF R IG HTS (1789), quoted in Herbert Mitgang,

Handwritten Draft of a Bill of Rights Found, N.Y.
30. See, e.g., Cress, supra note 17.

TIMES, July 29, 1987, at Al, C21.
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The issue is not so simple. If the relationship between the armed citizen
and the militia has become somewhat theoretical, if not tenuous, in late
twentieth-century

America, 31 important questions about arms

and

rights

nonetheless remain. Perhaps the most fundamental of these questions has to do
with the militia itself. What, from the point of view of the Framers of the
Second Amendment, was the reason for attempting to guarantee a militia and
an armed population to support it? One might view the sole purpose as the
military goal of enabling states and communities to meet their security needs
by being able to draw upon an armed population whenever necessary. If so,
then the frequently advanced argument that the preemption of national, state,
and community security by the police and armed forces has largely made the
Second Amendment moot has some merit, even granting the claim that an
armed population retains a residual security function. If the purpose of the
Second Amendment was purely military, then the right of the government to
dissolve the militia of the whole and substitute more efficient police and
military organizations is clear. The right protected is simply a right of the
government to raise militias or similar bodies. When the government no longer
needs to do so, it may disarm the population. This purely military view of the
Second Amendment in turn raises the question of why the Amendment was
ever needed. Governments that need to raise emergency security forces on an
ad hoc basis from the population at large can, of course, store weapons to be
distributed to the population during times of emergency. This can be, and often
has been, done even by totalitarian states that do not guarantee a right to arms,
nor indeed many other rights.32
But there is considerable evidence that the armed population and the
militia were intended to serve more than a simple military function. They were
seen as fulfilling political and perhaps moral purposes as well. 33 Indeed, the
government's ability to disarm the population must be questioned if the
purposes of guaranteeing a right to arms and organizing popular militias
include allowing the citizen to resist governmental tyranny and preventing the
citizen from becoming overly dependent on the government for survival.34

31. It should be noted that federal law still recognizes the concept of the militia at large. See I 0 U.S.C.
§ 311 ( 1988). Also, the majority of states still recognize that fraternal twin of the militia at large, the posse

�

com tatus, the power of law enforcement officials to summon the citizenry at large to aid authorities in
makmg arrests and quelling civil disturbances. See, e.g., C A L. PENAL CODE § 150 (West 1991); MONT.
CODE ANN.§ 45-7-304 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-2 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-22
(1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2921.23 (Anderson 1993).
32. During World War II, the Nazi government managed to mobilize a significant civilian militia in
Germany, the Volksturm, which was equipped with government-supplied arms. ALAN CLARK, BARBA ROSSA:
THE RUSSIAN GERMAN CONFLICT, 1941-1945, at 397-98, 425 (1965).
33. See, e.g., Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP.

PROBS. 125, 126--33 (1986).

34. See Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, supra note 16, at 91-98;
Shalhope, supra note 33, at 126--33; Will, supra note 15, at A21. Richard Henry Lee succinctly expressed
the fears of many Framers concerning unhealthy reliance on select forces for the security of the citizenry
when he charged that such reliance "commit[s] the many to the mercy, prudence, and moderation of the
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Can the government, in effect, extinguish the population's right to the means
of resistance and self-reliance by determining that its right to raise police and
military forces is best served by allocating resources to professional and
semiprofessional organizations rather than by maintaining the unwieldy, and
admittedly less effective, militia of the whole?
This question of the balance of power between the state and its citizens is
one of long-standing c oncern in the history of arms and rights. For example,
the seventeenth-century Stuart monarchs both established select militias and
attempted to disarm large portions of the English population.35 Wel l into the
late nineteenth century, a consensus about the relationship between arms and
political liberty existed among constitutional commentators. In 1 833, U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story expressed his fear that popular neglect of
the militia, which even by that date had considerably less than universal
participation, could weaken the arming of the population:
The right of the citizens to keep, and bear arms has justly been
considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it
offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power
of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first
instance, enable the people to resist, and triumph over them. And yet,
though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well
regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised,
that among the American people there is a growing indifference to
any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense
of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to
keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult
to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead
to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all
the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of rights.36
Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas M. Cooley also expressed the
traditional view linking the preservation of the right to arms and the ability of
the population to resist potential governmental usurpation. His analysis
anticipated and answered the modern view that the right only extended to
members of the militia:
The Right is General.-lt may be supposed from the phraseology
of this provision that the right to keep and bear arms was only
guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an interpretation not
warranted by the intent. The militia, as has been elsewhere explained,
consists of those persons who, under the law, are liable to the

few." Quoted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 229 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966).
35. See generally To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 17-53 (discussing efforts of Charles I
and Charles II to prevent rebellion by disarming English population).
36.

STORY, supra note 24,

at

708--09.
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performance of military duty, and are officered and e � rolled for
.
service when called upon. But the law may make prov1s1on for the
enrolment of all who are fit to perform military duty, or of a small
number only, or it may wholly omit to make any provision at all; and
if the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty
might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act of the
government it was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the
provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the mil itia must
be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no
permission or regulation of law for the purpose. But this enables the
government to have a well regulated militia; for to bear arms implies
something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to
handle and use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready
for their efficient use; in other words, it implies the right to meet for
voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public
order.37
The writings of Justice Story and Justice Cooley reflected a constitutional
consensus that had been developing in Anglo-American jurisprudence and
political philosophy since the seventeenth century. Part II of this Review
examines the origins of that consensus in seventeenth-century England.
II.

FROM ANCIENT DUTY TO INDUBITABLE

RIGHT

Malcolm focuses in To Keep and Bear Arms on the origins of the
constitutional consensus concerning the right to arms in the political turmoil
of seventeenth-century England. The first to treat the subject at book length,38
Malcolm traces the notion of a right to arms from the subject's traditional duty
under English law to have anns and participate in the militia and sheriff's
posse to the political conflict that led to the adoption of a provision
safeguarding the right of Protestants to have arms in the English Declaration
of Rights of 1689.39 Her study continues beyond the seventeenth century,
examining how the notion of a right to arms and its link to political liberty
became a major element of the Whiggish variant of Anglo-American political
thought on both sides of the Atlantic in the eighteenth century.
Malcolm begins with the important insight that the notion of a right to
arms was a relatively late development in English political thought. A legal
duty to own arms to participate in the common defense had existed from the

37. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CO NSTITUTI ONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
C. McLaughlin ed., Boston, Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1898); see also THOMAS M.

OF AMERICA 298 (Andrew

COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTI ONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 498-99 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th ed. 1903).

38. Malcolm had previously published articles addressing the English right to arms. See sources cited

supra note 1 7.

39. "That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions
and as allowed by Law." English Declaration of Rights, I W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1 689) (Eng.).
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dim beginnings of English history.40 Lacking a standing army until the
seventeenth century and professional police forces until the nineteenth, English
authorities traditionally relied on privately equipped citizen forces for both
internal security and defense of the realm.41 Beginning in the twelfth century,
the duty to be armed was specifically codified. In 1 1 8 1 , the Assize of Arms
was proclaimed, requiring that all free men possess arms and armor suitable
to their condition.42 By the thirteenth century the requirement to possess arms
to participate in the common defense was extended to medieval England's
unfree class, the villeins.43 Those of that class possessing sufficient property
also were required t o be armed and to participate in maintaining the security
of their communities.44
Participation w a s meant to be vigorous. All able-bodied men were part of
the militia. Sheriffs employed the posse comitatus, the legal power to summon
the help of all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty. All subjects were
expected to participate in giving chase to criminal suspects, supplying their
own

arms

for the

occasion. There were

legal penalties

for

failure to

participate. 45
From the beginning, this requirement of an armed population coexisted
with regulation of the possession of arms along class46 and later religious
lines.47 By the sixteenth century, Parliament passed a statute that limited the
carrying of some handguns and crossbows to those with incomes over one
hundred pounds per year. 48
This world of the universally deputized English population, ready to assist
either the sheriff's posse or the king's militia with arms appropriate to station
in life, began to change fundamentally in the sixteenth century. A s religious

40. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS,

4 1 . Id.

supra note 2,

at 1 - 1 1 .

42. WILLIAM STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO lHE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 1 8 1 -84 (H.W.C. Davis ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press, 9th ed. 1 948) ( 1 870).

43. Pollock and Maitland note that villeinage was a type of unfree land tenure in which the tenant in
villeinage might be either a serf or a free man. In either case the property rights connected to the tenure
were not protected by the king's courts or law but instead by the custom of the manor. A free man who
held in villeinage could leave the property or acquire other property not connected to his lord. A serf, on

the other hand, was an unfree man holding an unfree land tenure. He usually passed to the lord's heirs with
the land, though, like the free villein, the serf could be ejected from the land at the lord's w i l l without any
recourse to the king's courts. For students of American s lavery it is interesting to note that, while an
English serf seems to have had no ability to take legal action against the lord, he was to be treated by the

law as a free man in disputes with those other than his lord. I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 356--83, 4 1 2-23 (2d ed.
1959).

44. Id. at 42 1 , 565.

45. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS,
ENGLISH LAW 59 ( 1 966); Malcolm,
46.

See supra

supra note 2, at 3; see also ALAN HARDING, A
The Right of the People, supra note 1 7, at 29 1 .

SOCIAL HISTORY OF

notes 43-44 and accompanying text.

supra note 2, at 1 1 .
The Right of the People, supra note 1 7,

47. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS,
48.

Malcolm,

on arms ownership generally).

at 292-93 (challenging view that restriction was
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Catholics
of

arms.

Increasingly, arms in the h ands of Catholics w ere seen less as contributions to
the common defense and more as instruments of potential subversion. Still, as
Malcolm tells us, these restrictions never rose to the level of total prohibition
of arms for defense of the home.49
Other developments further weakened the traditional link between the
people, their arms, and the common defense. By the sixteenth century it was
becoming clear that the indifference to militia training and disc ipline against
which Justice Story50 would caution his fellow citizens some three c entu ries
later had overtaken the English people. Despite Henry VITI's best efforts to
revive militia training, particularly marksmanship practice, the m ilitia rem ained
an indifferent military force. The population at large was reluctant to devote
much time to military drill, and the Crown had to contend with the possibility
that the militia would prove politically unreliable when called upon to suppress
internal dissension.51
This sixteenth-century world-characterized by waning adherence to the
traditional obligation to be armed, religious

turmo il,

and

the Crown's

dependenc e on an often less-than-reliable militia-would provide, later in the
seventeenth century, some of the princ ipal ingredients for the first serious
attempts at large-scale disarming of the English people. Ch arles I's attempts
to create a more reliable m ilitia led to efforts at intensified train ing,52 which
frequ ently increased friction between the Crown and its subjects. Both James
I and h is son Charles I enforced game l aws with a greater vigor than their
Tudor predecessors.53 Both asserted a roy al monopoly on product ion of
gunpowder.54
By the time of the English Civil War in

1642, the mechanisms w ere in

plac e for wholesale attempts to disarm large port ions of the English population.
Royalists attempted to disarm republicans who--naturally-sought to return
the favor, particularly after the execution of Charles I and the establishment of
the Commonwealth Interregnum under Oliver Cromwell. Republic an rule
brought about a p rofessional army and efforts to disarm the e leven-year
Protectorate's enemies, among them royalists and Catholics.55 With the New
Model Army usurping the militia's role as the nation's primary defense force,
the militia increasingly came to be used for police purposes such as disarming
dissidents.56
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.

See STORY, supra note 24; see also supra text accompanying note 36.

To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 - 1 5 .
Id. a t 7 .
Id. a t 1 3- 1 5.
Id. at 1 7-1 8.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
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The Restoration brought a reversal of republican and royalist fortunes. That
the Commonwealth government had only sought to disarm a minority of the

�

�

En lish popul tion57 attested to a governmental belief that

the majority

actively or tacitly supported the republ ican cause.58 For Charles II and his

supporters, the relatio n s h i p between the armed population and the threat of

rebellion was even more acute than it had been for Cromwel l . Faced with a
well-armed popu lace, much of which had republican sympathies, and i nitially
lacking military forces and arms, Charles II approached the business of
disarming potential subversives with caution . One of the tools used to perform
this task was the establishment of a select m i l itia, volunteer units given
intensive military training. Such units were valuable because they received
training superior to the o ften haphazard dri l l of the militia at large. They could
also be selected for their political reli ability. Charles II, suspicious of the
English trad ition o f the armed population, used this select m i litia to disarm
those considered "politic ally unreliable," a category that continued t o expand
under his re ign.�., Charles H's efforts were aided by Parliament's passage of
the Game Act o f 1 67 1 .Mi

But Charles II fa iled to achieve h i s goal of large-scale disarmament.

Restrictive firearms legislation seems to have been enforced with a decided
ambivalence by the courts and the nobil ity.61 It would take the reign of James

II and inc reased fears o f monarchical absolutism and Catholic domination62
to cause widespread oppos ition to disarmament and the formal i ntroduction of
a right to arms into English constitutional sensibilities. James II sought to
enforce arms restrictions with greater v i gor than his predecessor.63 And the

�

pattern that had p revailed for nearly a century-that Protes ants' p s ession of
� �
arms was unquestioned while Catholi c s ' was viewed with susp1c1on-was

57. Id. at 23.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 3 1 -53.
60. Id. at 54-76.
6 1 . Id. at 3 1 -76.
.
had their
62. A not altogether insu stant1al case can be made that · odem Americans and Britons have
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reversed. James II sought to disarm the increasingly restless Protestant
majority-while keeping arms in the hands of his Catholic allies.64
The Glorious Revolution, the Protestant rebellion that swept James II from
the throne and replaced him with William and Mary, brought with it a demand
for formal limitations o n royal power and recognition of the rights of subjects.
The Declaration of Rights of 1689 expressed what, by the end of the
seventeenth century, had come to be regarded as the "ancient rights of
Englishmen." Included was a right to arms for Protestants.65
Among the many strengths of Malcolm's study is that it takes the
discussion of English sentiments on the right to arms beyond the 1689
Declaration. In the eighteenth century, Whiggish .t hinkers warned against the
dangers posed by standing armies and extolled the virtues of an armed
citizenry, or at least an armed Protestant citizenry. Malcolm's examination of
the growth of this sentiment and how it translated into legislative and judicial

64. Id.

65. The plain text of the English provision, the obvious ancestor of the Second Amendment, has posed
problems for collective rights theorists. Some have tried to read the seventh provision of the English
Declaration of Rights as only protecting the right of the militia to be armed, see, e.g., Weatherup, supra
note 2 1 , at 973-74, but that is a highly strained reading of a provision in which the word "militia" is
nowhere used. Malcolm's previous research also indicates that the convention that drafted the Bill of Rights
initially discussed the drafting of a dual collective and individual rights provision, ultimately rejecting that
possibility for the final provision with which we are familiar. The arms provision went through three drafts:
[ 1 .] It is necessary for the publick Safety, that the Subjects which are Protestants, should
provide and keep Arms for their common Defence. And that the Arms which have been
seized, and taken from them, be restored.
[2.]

[3.]

That the Subjects, which are Protestants, may provide and keep Arms, for their common
Defence.

That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their
Conditions and as allowed by Law.
Quoted in Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 17, at 307.
Nor have those attempting to read a militia-only right into the English provision been able to explain
how it is that I 8th-century English commentators such as Blackstone saw the right in individual terms. See
infra note 68 and accompanying text.
Some collective rights theorists also have tried to explain away the 1 689 right to arms by noting that
it did not prevent subsequent regulation of arms in Britain, including a fairly draconian regime (by
American standards) of gun control in the 20th century. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 1 42-43 ( 1 987); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 2 1 , at 9-1 0.
Subsequent firearms regulation, however, in no way casts doubt on the intended meaning of the 1 689
provision. The 1 689 provision was a statutory provision intending to limit the King's power. Under British
constitutional doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, the provision could not restrict subsequent acts of
Parliament. Despite Sir Edward Coke's efforts to introduce the notion that fundamental English legal
principles, as reflected in the common law, could restrict Parliament, see Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
646 (C.P. 1 6 1 0), that notion has been rejected, see Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham 's Case and Judicial
Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30 ( 1 926). Thus, although it might be possible to debate the extent to which
the 1 689 provision reflected long-standing English notions of a right to arms or merely a reaction to the
1 7th-century experience, to discuss it in American constitutional terms as limiting future legislation is to
fail to take into account the profound difference between American and British constitutionalism.
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su pport for the subject's right to arms66 supplies an important addition to a
too-long-neglected c hapter in English intellectual and legal history.
Undoubtedly the most important of the eighteenth-century jurists and
commentators to discuss the right to arms was William Blackstone. B lackstone
discussed the right to arms as one of the five auxiliary rights of the subject.
Some modern advocates of the collective rights theory have tried to argue that
because Blackstone listed the right to arms as an auxiliary right, the right was
somehow seen as a lesser right.67 In one sense, this is a correct reading, but
further exploration o f Blackstone's text reveals that he did not regard the right
to arms as a right of minor importance. B l ackstone's primary rights (personal
security, personal l iberty, and private property) were what he considered the
inherent rights of Englishmen. But B l ackstone also believed that these rights,
if they were to have any effect, had to be protected by constitutional
mechanisms. In his view, these mechanisms consisted of five auxiliary rights:
1 . The constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament . . . .
2 . The limitation o f the king's prerogative . . . .
3 . A Third S ubordinate right o f every Englishman is that o f applying
to the courts of justice for redress of injuries.
4 . If there should happen any uncommon i nj ury, or infringement of
the rights beforementioned, �hich th � ordinary course of law is too
.
_
defective to reach, there still remams a fourth subordmate nght
appertaining to every individual, namely the right of pe �itioning the
king or either house of parliament, for the redress of grievances.
" defience . . . . 68
5 . The fifth . . . i s that of having arms for their
•

Far from being inferior rights, in the practical constitutional sense,
Blackstone understood these auxiliary rights as the mechanisms that protected
the subjects· natural or i nherent rights. Thus, taking Blackstone at his st�ted

meaning, one would no more deem the right to arms as one of mmor
importance because it i s listed as an auxiliary right than one would ee

� �
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note 2, at I 33 .

10 12

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 104: 995

support remained for permitting Protestants the right to arms based on an
understanding that this right was part of the "ancient rights of Englishmen."7 1
This English heritage-which mixed arms and rights, militias and duties,
and fears of standing armies-migrated across the Atlantic. It did so in stages,
but the American experience in some respects was quite different from the
parallel English history. Although by the early seventeenth century the ability
of the English to rely on popular militias had become increasingly tenuous, this
was not the case in the frontier settlements of colonial America. Beset by
internal and external threats, early American settlements had very active
militias. 72 Settlements made considerable efforts to ensure the migration of
white men capable of bearing arms.73 The survival of colonies, particularly
in their early stages, rested on virtually74 universal militia partic ipation.
A mericans entered the eighteenth century conditioned by the English
heritage of a population armed for the common defense, but also altered by
their u nique American experience. The seventeenth-century experience in
frontier America had revitalized the concept of the militia at large, and had
demonstrated the need for private arms as a means of self-defense. The
seventeenth-century experience also altered views about law, arms, and classes
of citizens. For the white population, class and religious distinctions, and even
distinctions between English and non-English, became decreasingly important.
The entire white population had to be enlisted to counter threats posed by the
Indian population, the enslaved black population, as well as hostile European
powers.75 Also, the abundant resources of the new continent ensured that
game laws such as Charles H's statute of 1 67 1, which helped disarm large
numbers of common people in England, would not play a significant role in
early American life. Seventeenth-century American experience considerably
strengthened the colonies' transplanted English tradition of an armed
population.
There would also be a comparable shift in thinking about arms. As was the
case in England by the eighteenth century, the duty to have arms for the
common defense became increasingly conceived of as a right. This sentiment
would intensify by mid-century as differences with England grew and
Whiggish Americans increasingly perceived themselves to be the true heirs of
the Revolution of 1689 and the conservators of "the rights of Englishmen."76
7 1 . Id.
72. For an argument that to a considerable degree the militia was needed for racial control, see Cottrol
& Diamond, supra note 6, at 323-27.
73. Id.
74. In most colonies, militia membership was restricted to white men. As a practical matter, every
colony had free blacks, and occasionally slaves, who would participate in the colony's defense when it was
under attack. Id.
75. Id.
76. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 84-89 1 93-94
( 1 99�). John �hillip Reid �as given us an especially important reminder of the influence of the I 7t -century
English experience on attitudes towards arms and standing armies: "There are other dimensions
that the

h
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In the final chapter, Malcolm makes a highly persuasive case that the Militia
Clause of the Second Amendment, at the time of its drafting and immediately
thereafter, was widely understood to be advisory and cautionary, an expression
of preference for the militia over a standing army.77 The second clause was
even better understood: It was a broad grant of an individual right.78
Malcolm's afterword traces the ultimate evisceration of the right to arms
in the United Kingdom. Although British law and sentiment continued to
recognize the right to arms into the early twentieth century, the aftermath of
World War I brought with it restrictive gun control statutes that have increased
in severity as the twentieth century has unfolded.79 Of course, the right has
come under severe attack in the United States as well, especially since the
1 960's-often with considerably less intellectual honesty than i n the United
Kingdom.80
Among its other strengths, To Keep and Bear Arms is a meticulously
researched work in political and legal history. Whether unraveling the often
tangled strands of seventeenth-century English politics, showing how interest,
ideology, and sometimes sheer happenstance helped to transform a duty into
a right, or explaining the difference between the law of arms as formally stated
and the actual practice of jurists and juries, Malcolm demonstrates a keen
sensitivity to both historical process and the role of historical actors in
producing change. Her study illuminates an often wrongfully neglected chapter
in the constitutional and ideological histories of two nations. Through her study
of the right to arms, Malcolm also raises critical questions about the
relationship between custom and constitutional norm, and the extent to which
rights are produced not only through formal constitutional processes but also
through a people's social history.
How might a consideration of social history augment the essentially legal
and political history of the development of the right to arms in seventeenth-

standing-army controversy, when studied from the perspective of law, adds to our knowledge of the
American Revolution. One is the degree to which eighteenth-century Americans thought seventeenth-century

English thoughts." JOHN P. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW 4 ( 1 9 8 1 ) (emphasis added).

77. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 63-64.
78. Id. at 162.
79. Id. at 1 65-77; see also DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY:
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 71-74 (1 992).
80. Malcolm notes that Parliament, spurred by fears of disaffected World War I veterans, Irish
revolutionaries, and Bolshevism, debated arms control i n 1 920. Advocates of stricter arms control, unlike
many of their present-day American counterparts, forthrightly acknowledged that the right to arms was part
of existing constitutionalism. They argued, nonetheless, that it was obsolete and should be discarded. To

KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 175.
Undoubtedly, one reason that British supporters of stricter gun control were able to acknowledge the
existence of the right to anns as a constitutional principle while their American counterparts have not is
the different nature of the two constitutional regimes. While acknowledging that the 1 689 Declaration of
Rights indeed included a right to arms would not prevent contrary legislation by Parliament, a similar
acknowledgment concern i n g the Second Amendment would pose real difficulties for gun control advocates
because, presumably, it would set a limit beyond which Congress could not go absent constitutional
amendment.
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century England? It might shed yet further light on England's transformation
from a society that imposed a duty on the subject to be armed to one that
formally proclaimed the
constitutional story

right of the subject to have arms.

is clear enough. Before

The formal

1 689, there was no stated

recognition of a right to arms. That year, the right was officially recognized
in the Declaration of Rights. And yet, why is it that the opponents of
Charles II and James II could get strong agreement that the Stuart Kings were

attempting to infringe an "ancient[] and indubitable" right of Englishmen, 81
even though that right had not previously been formally expressed?

Part of the answer lies in the legal and political history ably related in
Malcolm's study. Another part of the answer lies in a cultural and social
history that Malcolm's study points us towards. Briefly stated, the English
tradition of arms created its own set of cultural dynamics.

An armed

population, and one to whom a considerable portion of the society's defense
is entrusted, constrains the power of the state in a number of significant ways.
The most obvious of these, and one that traditionally has been a part of the
discourse on arms and rights, is that an armed population makes state
oppression more difficult and makes citizen resi stance, even rebellion, more
possible. More relevant, from the point of view of the English in the
seventeenth century, is that a government largely dependent for its security on
its armed population is greatly constrained in its actions. While professional
police forces and armies can readily be enlisted to enforce unpopular laws or
to p unish popular lawbreakers, mobilizing the population at large for such
endeavors is more problematic.82 The English thus were accustomed to a
government whose use of force, whether ordered by the county sheriff, or
indeed the monarch, was circumscribed by the need to get the consensus of the
ordinary people who responded to the hue and cry, or constituted the
militias.83

81.

English Declaration of Rights, I W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 ( 1689) (Eng.).

82. For details on the unpopularity of mandatory militia service, see general ly id. at 4-5.
83. A very strong parallel can be drawn between the English use of the population at large to secure
the physical safety of the society and the use of the jury to decide the outcomes of trials . Just as community
sentiment constrained the sheriff's physical ability to enforce the law, popular sentiment in the fonn of the
jury limited the ability of the Crown and the courts to convict criminal defendants. It is probably no
accident that a fonnal recognition of this power of the jury came during the Restoration i n 1671 with Chief

Justice Vaughan's opinion in Bushell's Case, I Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). For a useful

overview of the development of the jury's role, see THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO
CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1 800 (1985) .

On� also co�ld argue that the same distrust of popular power that has weakened the prerogatives of
.
the JUry m Amencan law has also served to erode the right to bear arms and the notion of uni versal
participation in the defense of the community. In both cases, the growth of professions-the legal
profession in the case of juries, and the military and police in the case of posses and militias-with vested
interests n truncating c�mmunity pa�i�ip�tion helped weaken the role of the population at large in

�

safeguardmg the community or determmmg its legal standards. For a good discussion of the erosion of the
American jury's powers, see general ly Albert W. Alschulcr & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the
.
Criminal Jury in the United States, 6 1 U. CHI. L. REV . 867 ( 1994).
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Although the traditional link between the role of private arms and the
preservation of a n English society less oppressive than its continental
contemporaries84 has escaped formal discussion by jurists and other legal
commentators, distrust of armed professionals and belief in the i mportance of
private arms as a means of self-defense had long pedigrees in English society
and culture. 85 The importance of this traditional culture of arms to the
ultimate constitutionalization of the right to arms at the end of the seventeenth
century cannot be underestimated. Certainly by the sixteenth century, if not
long before, English belief in the superiority of their institution s and customs
as compared with those of the rest of Europe was pronounced. S purred on by
English difference-the early adoption o f a variant of Protestantism in contrast
to the Catholic dominance of much of the continent, a relatively limited
government, a relative respect for individual liberty-Englishmen came to
contrast what they saw as the happy condition of their kingdom with less
enlightened conditions elsewhere.86 English custom was seen as not simply
superior, but indeed as somehow more accurately reflecting the natural order.
This was not simply a popular view, but indeed one that came to be the view

84. See G.M. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY 1 66--67 ( 1 942).
85. The Magna Charta indicated an eariy English d istaste for standing armies. Article XLI stated
"(t]hat the King shall remove all Foreign Knights, Stipendiaries, Crossbowmen, lnfringers, and Servitors

who came with horses and arms to the injury of the kingdom." RICHARD THOMSON, AN HISTORICAL EsSAY
ON THE MAGNA CHARTA OF KING JOHN 57 (London, Johnson 1 829). Without indulging in too much

speculation, one might draw some interesting parallels with regard to the right to arms between the granting

of the Magna Charta, the announcement of the English Declaration of Rights of 1 689; and the creation of
the U.S. Bill of Rights of 1 79 1 . All three documents, which express limitations on governmental power and
set forth individual rights, were the products of insurrections by armed populations. The role of private

arms in bringing about the new constitutional order was the subject of an extensive celebratory literature.

The Robin Hood legend, describing the rebellions against King John, is the most prominent of these; and,
of course, the Minutemen at Lexington and Concord retain a mythic value for most Americans to the

present day. In a similar vein, it is probably not coincidental that the modern nation with one of the
strongest traditions of an armed citizenry and a universal militia, Switzerland, is a nation whose founding

myth, the story of William Tel l , involves armed rebellion against a foreign tyranny. These are the kind of

foundations on which a folk culture linking private arms and individual l iberty are likely to pen;ist
regardless of the state of legal commentary.

The link between possession of arms and freedom and full membership in the community appears

to have been a long-standing part of Germanic culture, from which English culture was partly derived.
Sociologist Orlando Patterson notes that in England and other Germanic cultures, the freeing of slaves
generally was accompanied by presenting the former slave with his own arms. ORLANDO PATTERSON,

SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATii 2 1 7- 1 8 (1 982).
86. This sentiment was perhaps best captured by Gaunt in Richard the Second:
This royal throne of kings, this sceptered isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,

This fortress built by Nature for herself,
Against infection and the hand of war,

This happy breed o f men, this little world,
This precious stone set i n the silver sea,

Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or

as

a moat defensive to a house

Against the envy of less happier lands;

This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England . . . .

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD THE SECOND act 2,

SC.

1.
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of English jurists who saw English custom, as reflected in the common law,
as embodying immutable principles of n atural law.87
Thus, in important ways, the Stuart attempts to limit the right to arms ran
counter to strong cultural traditions, traditions that distinguished English
society from the societies of continental Europe. At a time when English
custom was taken as a reflection of the natural order, it was not hard to
convince the drafters of the Declaration of Rights that an "ancient[] and
indubitable" right had been encroached by James II. In this sense, Malcolm's
book furnishes us with an important reminder that constitutional sensibilities
are shaped not only by the elite cultures of jurists and legal commentators but
by prevailing custom and folk tradition as well.
III.

CUSTOMARY NEGLECT AND CULTURAL DESUETUDE:

THE WANING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS
If the robust English tradition of the community at arms helped shape the
constitutional sensibilities that led to the formal recognition of the right to arms
in 1 689, subsequent developments would ultimately shift the notion of a right
to arms from near the center of British constitutional thinking to the far
periphery. That transformation in attitude, occurring over centuries, represented
more than a shift in sentiments on the part of legislators, jurists, and legal
theorists. It also reflected a decreasing English experience with the resort to
private arms for community, or even personal, defense in the centuries
following the Declaration of Rights. As such, the English experience with arms
and rights raises important questions that go beyond the question of private
arms and constitutionalism. The erosion of the English right to arms and its
ultimate evisceration in the twentieth century illustrate the difficulty of
maintaining a right solely through theoretical abstraction in the face of
widespread disuse.
A.

Before the Fall: Public Safety and the Security of Rights-A Resolution
The nineteenth century would begin with apparent continued agreement

that the right to arms played a critical role in securing the liberties of the
English subject. Certainly the English experience in the eighteenth century
enhanced the ideology of arms, rights, and freedom proclaimed i n the 1 689

87.

Undoubtedly the strongest expression of the view that common law embodied natural law was Sir

Edward Coke's opinion in

!

1610

in Dr. Bonham 's Case. In that case, Coke expressed the view that common

law pr ndples �ven controlled acts of Parliament, making contrary acts void. Although this early notion
.
of JUdtctal review would not be adopted by English jurists, it clearly had an important influence on
American jurisprudence. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.

646, 652

(C.P.

1 6 1 0);

WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH,"

( 1979);

Plucknett, supra note

65.

see also STEPHEN D.

162 1 - 1 628,

at

1 5-16
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Declaration and reiterated a century later in the American Bill of Rights.
Blackstone's writing s would highlight the issue for lawyers and jurists on both
sides of the Atlantic. And although the concept of the universal militia
increasingly gave way to the efficiencies o f more selectively trained units,88
political observers in the eighteenth century still accepted the n otion that the
right to arms and the preservation •of political freedom were inextricably
linked. For example, Swiss constitutional commentator Jean DeLolme, author
of the 1775 classic, The Constitution of England,89 perceived that the key to
the preservation o f rights in England was the right to resist g overnmental
tyranny.90 He suggested that this right of resistance should be seen not only
in rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom to
petition government for redress of grievances, but also in the right of the
English to be "provided with arms for their own defence."91 DeLolme saw
this right as a deterrent, establishing a hedge against governmental tyranny:
"The power of the people is not when they strike, but when they keep in awe:
it is when they can overthrow everything, that they never need to
move . . . . "92
Social conditions reinforced this Whiggish celebration of the armed
population. The widespread violence of eighteenth-century England, a
condition that would persist well into the next century,93 made the ownership
and use of arms necessary for much of the English population . Professional
police forces would not begin to take over the task of law enforcement from
the citizenry at large until the first decades of the nineteenth century.94
Although eighteenth-century legal commentators and political philosophers
extolled the virtues of the armed population with one eye on the excesses of
the seventeenth-century Stuarts, the average subject had more immediate
concerns-the need for arms to fend off common criminals. In an important

88. Hardy, Historiography, supra note 16, at 24-27.
89. JEAN DELOLME, THE CONSTIT UTION OF ENGLAND (John MacGregor ed., London, J. Cuthell 1853)
(1 775). Jean DeLolme arrived in England in 1 765 as Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
appeared, and ten years later produced The Constitution of England, a work of such significance that
Disraeli would later praise DeLolme as "England's Montesquieu." To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note
2, at 1 66.
90. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 66.
9 1 . DELOL ME, supra note 89, at 2 1 5; see also To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 66. The
right to resistance was not merely abstract, but of true consequence. Resistance to arbitrary power, DeLolme
pointed out, "gave birth to the Great Charter," DELOLME, supra note 89, at 214, and had

as

well accounted

for the overthrow of James II, id. at 2 1 5. Thus, not only did political theory prescribe, but experience had
taught, that "resistance is . . . the ultimate and lawful resource against the violences of power." Id. at 214.
92. DELO LME, supra note 89, at 2 1 9; see also To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 66.
93. See J.M. BEATTI E, CRIME AND THE COURTS JN ENGLAND, 1 660-1 800, at 36-37, 252-64 ( 1 986).
For a collection that provides vivid portraits of crime and punishment in I 8th-century
DO UGLAS HAY

ET

England, see

AL., AL BION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

( 1 975).
94. See TREVELYAN, supra note 84, at 230, 482; R.K. WEBB, MODERN ENGLAND: FROM THE 1 8TH
CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 1 84-85 ( 1 970).
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sense, however, the two sets of concerns reinforced each other, sustaining a
consensus on the right to arms.
The importance ascribed to the right to arms can be seen in Malcolm's
description of the passage and aftermath of the 1 820 Seizure of Arms Act.95
The French revolutionary wars had been followed by a decline in real wages
for workers in England, and social unrest, including riots in industrial districts,
ensued. Fears for public safety reached crisis levels after August 1 8 1 9, when,
at St. Peter's Fields in Manchester, a peaceful crowd protesting increased bread
prices and demanding reform of Parliament was fired upon. Twelve people
were killed and hundreds injured. In November 1 8 1 9, another crowd gathered
near Burnley to protest the Manchester killings and discuss parliamentary
reform. A confrontation with soldiers ensued; many in the crowd drew
concealed weapons, including pikeheads and pistols.96
In the end, the crowd dispersed without injury, but not without further
consequence. Several of the organizers were arrested and six were convicted
of c ausing people to go armed to a public meeting. In his summation of the
case to the jury, the trial judge cited the English Declaration of Rights in
asking, given the right of Protestant English to "Arms for their Defence
suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law," whether the weapons in
question were "suitable to the condition of people in the ordinary class of life,
and are they allowed by law?" The judge registered his discomfort with the
idea that carrying arms was a mechanism for controlling government excess,
but he recognized that "a man has a clear right to arms to protect himself in
his house . . . [and] to protect himself when he is going singly or in a small
party upon the road where he is travelling or going for the ordinary purposes
of business," including the purpose of attending a public meeting, except "to
create terror and alarm."97 Thus, while still confirming the underlying utility
and legitimacy of the right to bear arms as an instrument of self-defense, the
trial judge reserved judgment on Blackstone's statement of the right to arms
as a hedge against tyranny and held the door open for the jury to find the
defendants guilty.
Parliament responded to the Manchester and Burnley riots by passing the
Seizure of Arms Act.98 Adopting the rationale provided by the trial judge in
the B urnley riot case, the Act authorized search warrants allowing constables
in specified troubled industrial areas to search for and seize weapons kept "for
a purpose dangerous to the Public Peace."99 In view of the seemingly
95. Seizure of Arms Act, I Geo. 4, ch. 2 ( 1 820) (Eng.); see also To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra

note 2, at 1 68--69 (discussing passage and aftermath of Seizure of Arms Act).

96. See To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 66-67.
97. Id. at 168 (citation omitted). The fact that one anticipates an attack by the police is no excuse for

carrying a weapon if one's underlying reason for carrying the weapon is to cause terror and
alarm.
98. Id.

99. Seizure of Arms Act, 1 Geo. 4, ch. 2 ( 1 820) (Eng.).
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imminent soc ial upheaval , support for this legislation would have been
certainly understandable. Yet , as Malcolm points out , the opponents in
Parliament to this legislation vigorously argued that the measure violated the
right to bear arms-the right to defend oneself and one's fam ily and
property.100 Even t h e government 's spokesman, Lord Castlereagh, conceded
this, but argued that a situation of public necessity demanded the c onstitutional
.
IOI p l"
. ht be compromis
ng
ed.
ar iament agreed, but the Seizure Act was not
renewed upon its expiration two years later.

One of the c entral ironies concerning the right to arms emerged in the
events surrounding

the

Seizure

of

Arms

Act. Clearly,

the

legislation

compromised the right to arms. And although both Parliament and courts
remained willing to support the possession of arms for personal self-defense,
they demonstrated a clear reluctance to uphold the political d imension of a
right to arms: maintaining an armed p opulation as a deterrent to potential
governmental misconduct. This history demonstrates an inherent diff iculty in
the right to arms as a constitutional notion. Ultimately , to have legal meaning,
constitutional r ights must be safeguarded by legislatures or courts. It fairly can

be said that legislators and jurists are fundamentally conservative, regardless

of their stands on the issues of the day and regardless of where they are
located on contemporary pol itical and ideological spectrums. Can individuals
who have r isen to the top of a society's political apparatus be trusted, in the
long run, to safeguard the right to arm s , the popular means of r esisting that
apparatus? Or does the continuing viability of such a right, like its origins, owe
more to custom and tradition than to constitutional theory? The experience in
n ineteenth-century Great Britain suggests the latter. The British experience in
the twent ieth century and the divergent paths taken by the United Kingdom
and the United States in the twentieth c entury provide vivid reminders of the
importance of custom in maintaining constitutional traditions .

100. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 69. George Bennet spoke with perhaps a bit of
hyperbole when he remarked that "the distinctive difference between a freeman and a slave was a right to
possess arms; not so much, as had been stated, for the purpose of defending his property as his liberty."
41 T.C. HANSARD, THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1 803 TO THE PRESENT TIME 1 1 30-31
( 1 8 1 9), quoted in To KEEP AND l3EAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 69.
1 0 1 . Lord Castlereagh admitted '"that the principle of the bill was not congenial with the constitution,
that it was an infringement upon the rights and duties of the people, and that it could only be defended
upon the necessity of the case."' To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 169 (quoting 4 1 HANSARD,
supra note 100, at 1 1 6). Thus he argued, "some restrictive measures were necessary to preserve the
tranquility of the country." HANSARD, supra note I 00, at 1 1 32-33. Others who argued for the bill
pronounced the Seizure Act. consistent with the right to arms, as "'recogniz[ing] the right of the subject
to have arms. but qualif[ying] that right in such a manner as the necessit[ies] of the case require[d]."' To
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 221 11.25 (quoting HANSARD, supra note 1 00, at 1 1 62 (remarks
of George Canning)).
·

B.
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Fall from Grace: Twentieth-Century British Regulation of A rms
The twentieth-century history of the right to arms began inauspiciously

enough. The only significant firearms statute that would survive the nineteenth
2
century was the 1 870 Gun License Act, 10 and until 1903 it remained
Britain's only important firearms statute. 1 03 But even the Gun License Act
served primarily as a revenue measure, requiring those who wished to carry a
firearm outside the home to pay a nominal tax of ten shillings.

I04

The House

of Commons rejected stringent handgun control legislation in

1 893 and

1 895. 105 As the twentieth century opened, the right to bear arms remained
secure. Gun control legislation would pass in 1 903, but it merel y prohibited
sales to minors and felons, and little more. 1 06
In 1920, however, Parliament passed "a comprehensive arms control
measure that effectively repealed the right to be armed by requiring a firearm
certificate for anyone wishing to

'purchase,

possess,

use o r carry any

description of firearm or ammunition for the weapon. "'107 Only those who
could demonstrate to the local chief of police a "good reason for requiring
such a certificate" 1 08 could obtain a certificate or license, and a local chief
could reject anyone "of intemperate habits, unsound mind, or 'for any reason
unfitted

to

be

trusted

with

firearms .

"' I09

Malcolm

maintain s

that

the

incidence of armed crime was low in Britain at this time, and that the
prevalence of guns in society was not related to crime. Thus, she argues that
political reasons, not fear of violent crime, provided the primary impetus for
the 1 920 legislation . 1 10 This is certainly the case. Parliament was concerned
that demobilization had brought back from the Great War thousands of soldiers
trained in arms, desensitized by combat, and disillusioned by the years and
lives lost in a seemingly senseless conflict.1 1 1 Russia's participation in the
war had been followed by a revolution that swept the czar, the nobility, and

1 02 . Gun License Act, 1 870, 33 & 34 Viet., ch. 57 (Eng.).

I 03. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 70. Restrictions on the right to arms were relatively

minor until the 20th century. See also COLIN GREENWOOD, FIREARMS CONTROL: A STUDY OF ARMED
CRIME AND FIREARMS CONTROL IN ENGLAND AND WALES 25 ( 1 972).

I 04. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 70.

1 05 . Id.
I 06.

The Pistols Act of 1 903, 3 Edw. 7, ch. J 8 (Eng.).

1 07 . To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 7 0 (quoti ng Firearms Act, 1 920, JO & 1 1 Geo. 5,

ch. 43 (Eng.)).
1 08. Firearms Act, 1 920, I O & 1 1 Geo. 5, ch. 43 (Eng.).
1 09. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 70 (quoting Firearms Act, 1 920, IO & 1 1 Geo. 5,
ch. 43 ( �ng.)).
1 1 0 . Id. at 1 7 1 , 1 73.
111.

Unquestionably, since the War, there are far more people in this and every other
country than there were before the War, who not only know how to use firearms,
but who, as t�e res� lt of their War experience, and of the small value necessarily
placed upon hfe dunng the War, are prepared to use those firearms against
the State
and its officers.

1 30 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 663 ( 1 920) (remarks of Edward Winterton, M.P.).
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the monied clas s from power and eventually put Communists in control of
government. At home, the Communist Party was being organized, along with
the Trades Union Congress; Ireland, which would win its freedom in
" 2
was as yet "in a state of virtual civil war. 1 1

1921 ,

Facing desperate times, the Briti s h government decided on a radical
measure.In

1 9 1 8 , the B ritish Home Office had drafted a secret memorandum

proposing that firearms control measures be adopted before demobilization of
the troops at the e n d of the war, so that the arms carried by soldiers would not
3
be dispersed throughout the country.1 1 The memorandum's drafters warned
the Cabinet

that

the

measure would

be controversial.1 1 4

Although the

proposal remained secret until after Britain's armistice with Germany in
by

1918,

1 920 both the Cabinet and Parliament decided to move for the bill's

passage.
Malcolm emphasizes that the tenor of the debate over the

1 920 Act

exposed a sea change in attitudes toward the right to bear arms. Only one
member of Parliament argued in favor of self-defense as a reason to vote
against the bill 1 1 5-and he nevertheless voted in favor of its passage. 1 1 6
And though members questioned the propriety of allowing the police to
determine who would hold arms in the country, 1 1 7 they dismissed the
argument suggesting that the right to arms was of utility as a hedge against
governmental tyranny.
Even this argument 's ardent proponent, Lieutenant-Commander Joseph
Kenworthy-who suggested that it h a d been "'a well-know n object of the
Central Government in this country to deprive people of their weapons' "-did
not think that the right to arms was a necessary means of keeping the
government in check:
"I do not know whether this Bill i s aimed at any such goal as that
but, if so, I would point out to the right hon [orable] Gentleman that
if he deprives private citizens in this country of every sort of weapon
they could possibly use, he will not have deprived them of their
power, because the great weapon of democracy to-day is not the
halberd or the sword or firearms, but the power of withholding their
labour. I am sure that the power of withholding his labour i s one of
1 1 2. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 7 1 -72.
I 13. Id. at 1 72, 222 n.45.
1 1 4. Id. at 1 72.
1 1 5. Id. at 1 73.
1 1 6. John Jameson thought that '"for very many peaceful, law-abiding people it is a necessity of life
almost that, if they are to remain in life, they shall have firearms with which to defend themselves against
murderers and rebels."' Id. (quoting 133 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 86 (1920)). Only because permits were
available that would give i ndividuals "a chance of defending themselves" could Jameson vote for the bill.
1 33 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 86 ( 1 920).
1 1 7. See the remarks of Lieutenant-Commander Joseph Kenworthy, who preferred such powers to be
in the hands of a magistrate. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 74 (quoting 1 30 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 659 ( 1 920)).

( Vol. 1 04: 995

The Yale Law Journal

1 022

which certain Members of our Execucive would very much l ike lo
deprive him. But it is our last line of defence againsl tyranny. " l l M
This lukewarm support for the political dimension of lhe righl l o arms
drew vehement disagreement:
"[ Kenworthy 's] idea is that the State is an aggressive body, which is
endeavouring to deprive the private individual of the weapons which
Heaven has given into his hands to fight against the State . . . ( . )
Holding those views, and believing that it is desirable or legitimate or
justifiable for private individuals to arm themselves, with . . . ( . I the
ultimate intention of using their arms against the forces of the State,
he objects to this Bill. There are other people who hold those views
in this country, and it is because of the existence of people of that
type that the Government has introduced this B i l l . " 1 19
Indeed, another member countered

that

the

right

to arms

was an

anachronism, arguing that there would be " 'nothing more dangerous at the
present time, or indeed at any time, than to lead the people of the country to
believe that their method of redress was in the direction of armed resistance
to the S tate.

"' 1 20

Rather, the proper mode of resistance to governmental

misconduct-and indeed the only proper way to redress one's grievances-was
through an appeal to Parliament and the courts.

121

In the end, the Firearms Control Act passed with little opposition,
favor and only

6 against. 1

22

Refined in

1 937 and extended in 1 968 to include

shotguns, the Act continues in force today. 1
surrounding

it

demonstrated,

254 in

certainly

2

3

The Act, as the debates

represented

the

waning

of the

constitutional ideology of the right to arms proclaimed in the Declaration of

1 689 and reiterated by Blackstone in the eighteenth century. British fears of
foreign-induced

radicalism, 1

2
4

further

fueled

by

the

presence

of

large

1 1 8. Id. (quoting 1 30 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 658 ( 1 920)). Even if Kenworthy thought the right
to arms not so important as the power of the subjects to withhold their labor, he thought the right of

resistance of paramount importance: '" [T]he very foundation of the liberty of the subject in this country
is that he can, if driven to do so, resist, and I hope he will always be able to resist. You can only govern

with the consent of the people."' Id. (quoting 130 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 663 (1 920)).

1 1 9. Id. (quoting 1 30 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 662--63 ( 1 920) (remarks of Edward Winterton,

M.P.)).

1 20. Id. at 175 (quoting 1 30 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 670 ( 1 920) (remarks of Harry Barnes, M.P.)).
1 2 1 . To be sure, Major Harry Barnes correctly identified the powers and privileges of Parliament and

the rights to petition Parliament and the courts among those five auxiliary rights that guaranteed

maintenance of the three primary ones. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 1 , at * 1 43-45. In this, however,

Major Barnes rejected the reasoning of Blackstone that the three primary rights of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property were meaningless without all jive auxiliary rights he identified.

Compare id. with TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 75 (quotin g 1 30 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
67 1 ( 1 920) (remarks of Harry Barnes, M.P.) (arguing that i ncreased access to courts would '"tum [the

subjects'] attention away from using weapons."')).

1 22. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 75.
1 23.

Firearms Act, 1968, ch. 27 (Eng.).

1 24. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 171-72.
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numbers of embittered veterans-still recovering from the trauma of the Great
War 1 25 and all too familiar with modern weaponry-undoubtedly played a
significant role in reducing support for what was once deemed an ancient and
indubita ble right .
But something more seems to have played a role in the willingness of
Parliament-and apparently the general public-to surrender this portion of the
English constitutional heritage with so little dissent. The

1920 Act was the

result not only of a s hift in constitutional ideology, but also of a c hange in the
sociology of arm s and arms ownership. If Britons entered the nineteenth
cent ury owning arms on a widespread basis-reflecting a continued need for
personal defense, and to a lesser extent, a means of community defense-the
situation had become quite different by the dawn of the twentieth century. The
widespread vio lence and lawlessness of early nineteenth-century Britain had
been replaced by a considerably less violent, more law-abiding society as
Britain entered the Edwardian era.

126

During the course of the century, the

ad hoc posse had given way to professional police forces, 1 2 7 and citizen

participation in self- or com munity defense had become less and less common
place.
These developments meant that over t he course of the nineteenth century
fe wer Britons felt the need to own "Arms for their Defence." This was of
particular significance because it was roughly in the period from the mid1 860's until World War I-just when perceived popular needs for self-defense
·

were waning-that modern firearms technology, as we are now familiar with
it, came into being. 1 2 8 The inferential evidence1 29 suggests that the British

1 25. Id. ; see A.J.P. TAYLOR, ENGLISH HISTORY : 1 9 1 4- 1 945, at 120 (1 965) (indicating that 1 .5 million
British soldiers were wounded in World War I).

1 26. Ted R. Gurr, On the History of Violent Crime in Europe and America, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA:

HISTORICAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 353, 353-56 (Hugh D. Graham & Ted R. Gurr eds., 1979).

1 27. To KEEP AND BEAR ARM S , supra note 2, at 1 69.
1 28. For references to the history and development of firearms technology, see generally EDWARD C.
EZELL, S MALL ARMS OF THE WORLD (1983); ROBERT HELD, THE AGE OF FIREARMS: A PICTORAL
HISTORY (1957); HAROLD L. PETERSON, THE TREASURY OF THE GUN (1962).
129. Two pieces of e vidence suggest that the ownership of modern firearms was not widespread in
the United Kingdom at the time of the passage of the Firearms Control Act. First, the fact that the Act
could be passed with virtually no opposition suggests a relatively small constituency of pistol and rifle

owners. Second, by 1 940, the British government, facing the threat of a possible German invasion after
Dunkirk, began mobilizing a citizen's militia, or Home Guard. According to David Kopel, a student of
firearms regulation i n cross-national perspective: "The Horne Guard had to drill with canes, umbrellas,
spears, pikes and clubs. When citizens could find a gun, it was generally a sporti ng shotgun-ill-suited for
military use because of its short range and bulky ammunition." KOPEL, supra note 79, at 75. The British
government requested small arms for Home Guard use from private parties in the United States, including
the National Rifle Association.
If one were to contemplate a similar situation in the United States, it seems highly unlikely that
legislation such as the Firearms Control Act would result in such a wholesale disarmament of the civilian
population. If substantial numbers of gun owners were denied licenses under such an act, there would
certainly be an observable political reaction. Also, large numbers of firearms owners in the United States
would probably disobey such a Jaw. In any event, the likelihood that 20 years after the enactment of such
legislation it would b e difficult to equip an American Horne Guard in time of emergency seems highly
improbable. This discussion suggests that the British firearms-owning population prior to the enactment of
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public during this critical period did not acquire modern firearms .in large
1 30
.
quantities-in marked contrast to the contemporary Amencan expenence .
By the time of the 1 920 Act, arms ownership for defense was an increasingly
unimportant part of the experience of the average British subject. The
constitutional change, therefore, essentially ratified already accomplished social
and cultural developments.
IV. A CAUTIONARY TALE
It is in pointing u s to the intersection of legal and social change that Joyce
Lee Malcolm's To Keep and Bear Arms is at its most important and
tantalizing. The temptation to use this study to shed light on the contemporary
American gun control debate is compelling and entirely proper. Certainly
Malcolm's work sheds further light on the Second Amendment controversy,
creating even greater difficulty for die-hard adherents of the collective rights
view of the Amendment. 131 If her only contribution were to clarify our
discussion of the English origins of the right to arms, untangling the
complexities of the conflicts between the Stuarts and their opponents along the
way, it would be a significant one.
But her work does more. It raises important questions for our time. The
history of arms and rights has taken a very different turn in the United States
in the twentieth century than in the United Kingdom, less because of the
protection afforded by the Second Amendment or analogous provisions in state
constitutions132 than because of the ubiquity of modern firearms in twentieth
century American society. 133 The high level of violence in American society

the legislation was considerably less than what is currently the case in the United States.
1 30. The role of the Western frontier in fostering gun ownership in late nineteenth-century America
is well known and has been celebrated in American folklore and popular culture. Although less celebrated,
racial vi olence, particularly i n the South, was another major contributor to the maintenance of a widely
dispersed gun culture in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For a general
overview of the American gun culture, see LEE KENNETT & JAMES L. ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA:

THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA ( 1 975); ROGER D. MCGRATH, GUNFIGHTERS, HIGHWAYMEN AND
VIGILANTES: VIOLENCE ON THE FRONTIER ( 1 984).
1 3 1 . Malcolm's work indicates not only that the Framers saw the Second Amendment as protecting
an individual right against federal infringement, but also that some of the Framers' contemporaries even
saw the Amendment as protecting against potential state encroachment on the right to arms as well. See

To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 164. At least one antebellum state case echoed this view. See
Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243 ( 1 846). For an argument that Taney's decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. ( 1 9 How.) 393 ( 1 857), may have adopted the view that the Second Amendment constrained state

action, see Cottrol, supra note 1 8 , at xx-xxi.

It i s interesting i n light of this history that the Second Amendment's right to arms is one of the few
provisions of the Bill of Rights that has not been incorporated. Presser v. Illinois, 1 1 6 U.S. 252, 265 ( 1 886).

1 32. Forty-three states have state constitutional provisions protecting the right to arms. See STEPHEN
P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL

GUARANTEES (1 989).
1 33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also TASK FORCE ON GUN VIOLENCE, BAR ASS'N
OF S.F. ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 9 ( 1 994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]
(indicating that over 209 million firearms are in private hands in United States).
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both increases calls for stricter gun control 134 and increases firearms sales
and resistance to gun control measures. 1 35 A surprisingly large percentage of
Americans have personal experience with gun violence, either as victims of
criminal attack1 36 or in the use of guns for self-defense.137 This, of course,
ensures a continued constituency for a right to arms for defensive purposes in
late twentieth-century America, a constituency that was largely lacking in
Britain earlier in the century.
To Keep and Bear Arms performs yet another service, reminding us of the
importance of the debate over arms and rights and how, in too many ways, that
debate has been trivialized. Malcolm's study convincingly demonstrates how
the right to arms was once considered a vital cornerstone of Anglo-American
political philosophy and constitutionalism. Today that ancient principle is
largely defended by a group of hobbyists in the form of the National Rifle
Association. And while that organization is undoubtedly more decent and
indeed more perceptive than its over-demonized image might suggest, it is not
a body to which Americans are accustomed to turning for serious political and
constitutional c ommentary. 138 Nonetheless, the failure of the academy, 139
the civil libertie s community, 140 and the legal and intellectual communities
to engage more seriously the central issue posed by a right to arms is
disturbing.
If, as Malcolm's work clearly demonstrates, the right to arms is essentially
a question of the balance of power between a people and the state that governs
them, that question is far more important today than when it was first
formalized in seventeenth-century England. We have, in the twentieth century,
seen the rise of monstrous states capable of deprivations of liberty far in
excess of anything that the English Whigs who authored the Declaration of
Rights of 1 689-or their American successors in 1 791-could have envisioned.
By a conservative estimate, over sixty million people have been murdered by
their own governments in this century. 141 Mass murder o f defenseless
134. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 133, at 1 0.
135. See, e.g., Federal Licensing Procedures for Importing and Selling Firearms: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, I 03d Cong., 2 d Sess. 32 (1 994) (statement of Richard Gardner).
136. Sociologist Gary Kleck reports that i n 1985 there were 650,000 crimes involving guns. KLECK,
supra note 19, at 44.
1 37. Kleck reports that survey research data indicate between 600,000 to 900,000 civilians use firearms
for defense against crime each year. Id. at 1 06--07.
138. We tend to agree with William Van Alstyne's observation concerning Americans' virtual
abandonment of serious consideration of and advocacy for Second Amendment rights to the NRA: "[T]hat
it has taken the NRA to speak for them, with respect to the Second Amendment, moreover, is merely

i nteresting-perhaps far more as a comment on others, however, than on the NRA." Van Alstyne, supra
note 6. at 1254-55.
139. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
140. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1244 & n.24.
141. Sixty million is an extremely conservative figure. Some recent remarks by Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Ri ghts John Shattuck hint at the extent of government sponsored mass murder in this
century: "In the twentieth century the number of people killed by their own governments under
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civilians has occurred in the heart of Europe in Hitler's Third Reich; across the
breadth of Asia in Stalin's Soviet Union; in Mao's China, the world 's most
populous country ; as well as in Pol Pot's Cambodia and the African nation of
Rwanda, to name but a few. Nor do we lack American exam ples of how
popular defenselessness and a state monopoly of force can threaten freedom
and indeed life itself. That, in the light of the history of the twentieth century,
those we rely on for serious constitutional and political commentary have
failed to examine the issues of whether the state should have a monopoly of
force and whether a n armed population might still play an important role in
deterring governmental excesses bespeaks a dangerous intellectual cowardice,
a self-imposed limit on political and constitutional discourse that causes us
largely to ignore one of the most critical questions of our time.
By tracing these questions to a time when they were first articulated in the
modern era, Malcolm has performed an invaluable service in expanding the
boundaries of the contemporary debate. She has shown that history can speak
clearly to contemporary constitutional issues, not only by shedding light on the
always-vexing issue of original intent, but also by showing , in the case of arms
and rights, that the concerns that led to the constitutionalization of the right to
arms were not simply the transitory concerns of one historical moment, but
instead were vital issues with a long and enduring legacy.

authoritarian regimes is

four times the

number killed in all this century's wars combined." John Shattuck,

Remarks at the Women's National Democratic Club (Sept. 1 2, 1 993), available in LEXIS, News Library,

Fednew File (emphasis added).
If Shattuck's calculations are correct, they indicate that over 100 million individuals have been murdered
by their own governments in this century. The casualty figures for World Wars I and II alone exceeded 25
million. See ROBERT R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 841 (3d ed. 1 965).

